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ABSTRACT 
Volunteering and the Strategic Value of Ignorance    
by Florian Morath * 
Private provision of public goods often takes place as a war of attrition: 
individuals wait until someone else volunteers and provides the good. After a 
certain time period, however, one individual may be randomly selected. If the 
individuals are uncertain about their cost of provision, but can find out about this 
cost ahead of the volunteering game, a strategic value is attached to the 
information, and individuals may prefer not to learn their cost of provision. If the 
time horizon is sufficiently short, in equilibrium only one individual may acquire 
information about his cost. For a long time horizon, acquiring information is 
strictly dominant. The time limit is an important instrument in influencing the 
efficiency of the volunteering game. 
 
Keywords: War of attrition, volunteering, discrete public goods, asymmetric information, 
information acquisition 
 
JEL classification: H41, D44, D82, D83 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Volunteering and the Strategic Value of Ignorance  
Die private Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter ähnelt häufig einem “Zermürbungs-
krieg”: Die Beteiligten warten, bis sich jemand anderes freiwillig meldet und das 
öffentliche Gut bereitstellt. Nach einer gewissen Zeitperiode des Wartens kann 
jedoch ein Beteiligter zufällig dazu bestimmt werden, die Bereitstellung zu 
übernehmen. Wenn die Beteiligten ihre Bereitstellungskosten nicht genau 
kennen, sich aber vor dem Bereitstellungsspiel Information über ihre Kosten 
beschaffen können, dann kommt dieser Information ein strategischer Wert zu; 
die Beteiligten könnten es vorziehen, ihre Bereitstellungskosten nicht genau zu 
kennen. Wenn der Zeithorizont des Bereitstellungsspiels hinreichend kurz ist, 
entscheidet sich im Gleichgewicht lediglich ein Beteiligter, Information zu 
akquirieren. Bei einem längeren Zeithorizont ist es eine strikt dominante 
Strategie, sich Information zu beschaffen. Der Zeithorizont stellt ein wichtiges 
Instrument zur Beeinflussung der Effizienz des Bereitstellungsspiels dar.    
 
                                                 
*  I thank Kai Konrad, Michael Michael, and Johannes Münster for valuable comments. Financial 
support by the German Research Foundation (DFG) through grant SFB/TR 15 is gratefully 
acknowledged.  
 
 
1 Introduction
Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing are two famous examples1 for the provision of
a public good that induces a positive value for a certain group of individuals. One of
the individuals, however, has to pay some cost in order to provide the public good.
Such situations are often best described by a war of attrition: one volunteer is needed
for a certain task, and everyone prefers someone else to volunteer rst and bear the
cost of provision. Typically, there is a disutility or waiting cost attached to the time
until a volunteer is found. In this paper, we study the individuals incentives to
obtain information about their own cost of provision of the public good prior to a
volunteering game or war of attrition.
Wars of attrition are used to model a large number of applications from di¤erent
elds. Besides dragon-slaying, many unpleasant situations like intervening in a ght,
calling the police in case of a re or crime, household chores, ghts between animals,
or market exit exhibit properties of wars of attrition.2 Organizations typically rely
on the voluntary performance of a large number of tasks. These tasks may have to be
performed repeatedly, and the cost of performing the task may then be well-known.
But often the individuals dont know exactly how costly volunteering will turn out to
be. They may, for instance, only have a guess about the time involved in chairing a
university department or organizing a conference, but can acquire information about
this expenditure of time.
In many companies or institutions, sta¤ meetings take place on a regular basis
and are used to allocate tasks to individuals. Before volunteering to perform a task,
employees typically have the possibility to nd out about their cost of performing this
task, and they can do so by asking questions and collecting information. The ques-
tion, however, is what impact information acquisition has on the volunteering game
and whether individuals benet from information acquisition. If such information
acquisition can be observed by the other individuals - for instance when employees
ask questions - there is a strategic value attached to the information: it can be used
1Cf. Bliss and Nalebu¤ (1984).
2Many more examples are given, e.g., by Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996), LaCasse et al. (2002),
or Otsubo and Rapoport (2008).
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to commit to a certain behavior in the war of attrition. Similarly, on an international
level, when governments have to decide whether to provide an international public
good, they can engage experts to provide them with a better estimate of the cost of
provision. But when such investments in information are observable by other play-
ers, investments in information obtain a strategic character. These examples have in
common that the players cannot wait an innite amount of time before volunteering,
but that there is a time limit on their decision to concede.
We analyze the individualsincentives to acquire information about their cost of
provision of a public good in a two-stage game with two individuals. In the rst
stage, the individuals can obtain information about their cost of provision. In order
to focus on the strategic considerations, we assume that the information is available
at zero cost. Whether or not an individual decided to nd out about his cost can
be observed by the rival before the volunteering game starts. The information that
an individual has obtained, however, is only privately known to this individual. In
the second stage, a volunteering game or war of attrition takes place: the individuals
simultaneously choose a maximum waiting time after which they provide the public
good, given that nobody else has volunteered before. The waiting time until the
public good is provided involves a direct cost. As described above, individuals may
not be able to wait for an innite amount of time; therefore, we impose a nite
time horizon after which one of the individuals is randomly chosen to pay for the
provision. At some point in time, the dragon may itself decide to attack, or, in the
context of a rm, one employee will be selected by the team leader to perform the
task.
As we will show, the equilibrium of the volunteering game and the incentives to
learn the own cost of provision crucially depend on the length of the time horizon. For
a long time horizon, both individuals prefer to nd out about their cost of provision.
If the time horizon of the volunteering game is su¢ ciently short, individuals without
information about their provision cost prefer a random selection when the time limit
is reached to an early concession. As a consequence, an individual who found out that
his cost would be low may prefer to concede immediately. Therefore, not knowing the
own cost of provision can be advantageous in the volunteering game. For a su¢ ciently
3
short time horizon, there are two asymmetric equilibria where one individual nds
out about his cost and the other does not, and one symmetric equilibrium where
both individuals randomize their decision whether to learn their cost. The choice
of the time horizon is an important instrument in inuencing the e¢ ciency of the
volunteering game.
The literature on wars of attrition has its origin in applications in biology, model-
ing ghts between animals (e.g., Maynard Smith 1974, Riley 1980). Further impor-
tant applications are industrial competition and market exit (Fudenberg and Tirole
1986, Ghemawat and Nalebu¤ 1985, 1990). The seminal paper that studies the pri-
vate provision of a public good as a war of attrition is Bliss and Nalebu¤ (1984).
In their setup, the players are privately informed of their cost of provision, and the
equilibrium is e¢ cient in the sense that the player with the lowest cost provides the
public good. The provision of multiple public goods in the framework of a war of
attrition is analyzed by LaCasse et al. (2002) for the case of complete information,
and by Sahuguet (2006) in an environment with private information.3 Bishop and
Cannings (1978), Hendricks et al. (1988), Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996), and Myatt
(2005) study models that exhibit a nite time horizon. We add to this literature
by studying the e¤ects of information on the individuals concession times in the
private provision game, and the resulting incentives (not) to become informed. The
strategic considerations involved in the decision on information are similar to the
strategic aspects identied in di¤erent settings such as principal-agent relationships
(e.g. Crémer 1995, Kessler 1998): by remaining uninformed, individuals precommit
to a certain behavior in the subsequent interaction.4
Closely related to this paper is work that considers information in auctions.
3Further papers considering wars of attrition with privately informed players are Bulow and
Klemperer (1999), who analyze the case of multiple prizes, and Krishna and Morgan (1997), who
study the case of a¢ liated signals. Amann and Leininger (1996) consider a general class of all-pay
auctions with private information; the same class of all-pay auctions is analyzed in Riley (1999) for
the case of complete information. Che and Gale (1998) study rst-price all-pay auctions with caps
on bidding which are similar to the nite time horizon of the volunteering game assumed here.
4In the context of global warming, Morath (2010) analyzes investments in information in a
standard model of private provision of a continuous public good; the strategic e¤ects that are
present in this paper, however, are driven by the assumption that other countries can observe what
a country has learned.
4
Whereas the war of attrition is, in fact, a second-price all-pay auction, Morath and
Münster (2010) study information acquisition in a rst-price all-pay auction, but
in their setup, there is no purely strategic value of remaining uninformed. In the
context of winner-pay auctions, incentives to acquire information when decisions are
observable have been shown to depend on the exact auction format and on whether
information is about a private or a common value. An early contribution study-
ing the value of information is Milgrom and Weber (1982); recent work includes
Hernando-Veciana (2009), Larson (2009), and Hernando-Veciana and Tröge (2010).
The next section describes the setup of the model. We analyze in Section 3 the
three di¤erent situations that may arise in the volunteering game: no individual has
private information about his provision cost, only one individual is informed, or both
individuals are informed about their cost of provision. In Section 4, we consider the
incentives for information acquisition in a 2  2 game dened by the continuation
payo¤s in the volunteering game, and we discuss some implications from a designers
perspective. Section 5 assesses the robustness of our results. Finally, Section 6
concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 Setup
Consider the following game with two individuals, 1 and 2. One of the two individuals
has to provide a public good of xed quantity. (We assume that the contribution
that is needed for the provision is indivisible.) The individuals di¤er with respect to
their cost of provision, denoted by c1 and c2. These cost parameters c1 and c2 are
independent draws from a probability distribution that is common knowledge and
assumed to be a discrete function with
ci 2 fcL; cHg ; 0 < cL < cH ;
and probabilities
Pr (ci = cL) = pL; Pr (ci = cH) = pH = 1  pL; i = 1; 2:
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Moreover,
c := pLcL + pHcH
is an individuals expected cost of provision. At the beginning of the game, the
individuals know neither their own cost of provision nor their rivals cost, but only
that this cost can be high or low, and the corresponding probabilities.5
In stage 1 of the game, the individuals can nd out about their own provision cost:
if an individual decides to become informed, he privately observes his provision cost.
Information acquisition does not involve any direct cost, and the decisions whether
or not to obtain information are made simultaneously and become commonly known
at the end of stage 1.
In stage 2, the individuals i = 1; 2 simultaneously choose a time of concession
ti, i.e., individual i plans to provide the public good in ti if individual j 6= i has
not volunteered before ti. As soon as one individual volunteers, the game ends.
However, there is a maximumwaiting time T which is exogenously given and common
knowledge. Thus, the strategy space is restricted to ti 2 [0; T ]. If both individuals
volunteer exactly at the same time, the provision of the public good is allocated
with equal probability to the individuals. Waiting involves a direct cost to both
individuals, which is assumed to be linear in the waiting time.6 Stage 2 is strategically
equivalent to the war of attrition or second-price all-pay auction with a cap on
bidding.
Denoting by v an individuals utility from the provision of the public good, the
5The assumption of a discrete distribution determines the structure of the equilibrium strategies
in the war of attrition if at least one individual learned his cost. The result on incentives to become
informed qualitatively carries over to the case where the individualscost is drawn from a continuous
distribution. See the discussion in the concluding section.
6If the individuals have identical and strictly increasing cost functions b (ti) for the waiting time
ti, the analysis can be carried out in a similar way by employing ki = b (ti) as choice variable.
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payo¤ functions are given by
i (ti; tj) =
8><>:
v   tj; ti > tj
v   ci
2
  ti; ti = tj
v   ci   ti; ti < tj
; i = 1; 2: (1)
For all possible t1 and t2, the public good is provided, and its value v to the individuals
is assumed to be the same for both individuals and independent of the provision time.
The idiosyncrasies are captured by the provision cost. The individual who chooses
the lower waiting time has to bear the provision cost, and both individuals have to
pay the cost of waiting, determined by the minimum of t1 and t2. If both individuals
decide not to concede before T , that is t1 = t2 = T , one of them is randomly
selected to provide the public good, and their expected payo¤ in this case is equal
to v   ci=2  T .
3 The volunteering game
This section analyzes the war of attrition in isolation, xing the decisions on informa-
tion acquisition. The equilibrium concept is Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Whenever
players are symmetric in the sense that both have (have not) acquired information,
the analysis will focus on symmetric equilibria of the war of attrition.7
In the war of attrition, the individuals choose their time of concession ti, know-
ing the decisions on information. The time horizon T a¤ects the properties of the
equilibrium of the war of attrition for all possible stage 1 decisions. Compared to a
provision in ti < T , individuals can reduce their expected cost of provision by wait-
ing until T and then possibly being subject to a random selection. This trade-o¤
between lower expected provision cost and higher cost of waiting generates a time
interval before T in which, in equilibrium, there is zero probability that an individual
volunteers.
7In the next section, decisions on information acquisition will be considered in a 2  2 game
dened by the payo¤s in the war of attrition for the respective information structure.
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Lemma 1 Consider the war of attrition for a given information structure. In any
equilibrium of the war of attrition, there is zero probability that individual i with cost
ci provides the public good in
   ci
2
+ T; T

.
For a large T , it will always be an equilibrium of the volunteering game that an
individual j volunteers immediately. In this case, the equilibrium strategy of i is not
uniquely determined, and he may choose a concession time ti 2 ( ci=2 + T; T ), given
that in equilibrium he will not provide the public good. Any ti 2 ( ci=2 + T; T ),
however, is weakly dominated, and whenever there is positive probability that j waits
until T , individual i (with cost ci) strictly prefers ti = T to any ti 2 ( ci=2 + T; T ).
If T < ci=2, we have  ci=2 + T < 0, and i prefers the random selection in T to a
contribution in any ti < T . Lemma 1 holds independently of ci being is true or
expected cost of provision; therefore, it can also be employed if individual i decides
not to become informed.
In what follows, we will focus on the case of an intermediate time limit T :
Assumption 1 cL
2
< T < cH
2
:
As will become clear in the remainder of this section, Assumption 1 implies
that an individual with high cost will nd it optimal to wait until T , accepting the
consequence that he might be randomly chosen to fulll the task. An individual with
low cost will prefer an early concession if the rival waits su¢ ciently long.8
Building on this assumption, we rst determine the equilibria of the volunteering
game conditional on the decisions in stage 1, and we then analyze the incentives to
become informed in a 22 game dened by the ex ante expected payo¤s in the war of
attrition. Ex ante expected payo¤s are dened as the individualsexpected payo¤s
given the decisions on information, but before they nd out about their provision
cost.
8This assumption ensures the strategic role of the information acquisition because the equilibrium
of the volunteering game will crucially depend on the individualsdecisions whether or not to nd
out about their cost of provision. If T > cH=2, there is always an equilibrium of the war of
attrition where one individual concedes immediately, independently of the decisions in stage 1 and
the individualstrue provision cost. If T < cL=2, in the unique equilibrium of the war of attrition,
both individuals wait until T independently of the stage 1 decisions and their true cost.
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In the analysis of the war of attrition, if individual i knows his cost of provision,
we will denote by iL (iH) player i with low (high) cost of provision. Moreover, we will
have to allow individuals to randomize their concession time. Consequently, a mixed
strategy of an uninformed individual i 2 f1; 2g will be a cumulative distribution
function Fi. Moreover, qi (t) will be the probability that i concedes exactly at t,
and it will be employed to describe pure strategies. If i acquires information, we
denote by FiL (FiH ) the distribution function that corresponds to the mixed strategy
i chooses when his cost is low (high). Again, we will use qiL (t) and qiH (t) to describe
type-contingent pure strategies in case i acquires information.
Mixed strategies that individuals choose in the di¤erent continuation games will
exhibit a common structure. For this purpose, we dene a function  as

 
t; c; t; q0

=
8><>:
1  (1  q0) e  tc ; 0  t < t
1  (1  q0) e  tc ; t  t < T
1; t  T
: (2)
 (t; c; t; q0) describes a cumulative distribution function of concession times t with
positive mass in the interval (0; t), no mass in (t; T ), and possibly a mass point at
zero (of size q0) and/or a mass point at T .
No individual knows his cost of provision. If neither of the individuals knows
his true provision cost, both choose their waiting time based on their expected cost
c, and the volunteering game is strategically equivalent to the war of attrition with
complete information.9
Consider individual i and suppose that j waits until T with probability one. If
i concedes in ti < T , his expected payo¤ is v   c   ti. For ti = T , he gets a payo¤
of v   c=2   T . Thus, if T < c=2, ti = T is strictly preferred to any ti < T ,
and there is an equilibrium where both wait until T with probability one, which
is the unique equilibrium. If, however, T > c=2, is best response to tj = T is to
9This holds because individuals are assumed to be risk-neutral and the payo¤s are linear in the
provision cost. Thus maximizing expected payo¤s is equivalent to the maximization based on the
expected cost.
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concede immediately, and there are two equilibria, each with one individual choosing
qi (0) = 1, i = 1; 2. In the latter case, there are also equilibria in mixed strategies.10
As players are symmetric, we focus on the (unique) symmetric equilibrium.
Lemma 2 (No individual is informed.)
a) If T  c=2, in the symmetric equilibrium, q1 (T ) = q2 (T ) = 1.
b) If T > c=2, in the symmetric equilibrium, individual i 2 f1; 2g randomizes his
concession time according to Fi (t) = 
 
t; c;  c
2
+ T; 0

.
In the mixed strategy equilibrium (case T > c=2), for any tj 2 (0; c=2 + T ), js
marginal cost of waiting is one, multiplied by the probability (1  Fi (tj)) that this
waiting cost has to be paid. The marginal gain of waiting slightly longer is equal to
cF 0i (tj), i.e. the expected provision cost multiplied by the additional probability that
this cost can be saved. Individual j is indi¤erent between all tj 2 (0; c=2 + T ) if
cost and benet of increasing tj (i.e. of waiting slightly longer) are equal. This leads
to Fi (t) = 
 
t; c;  c
2
+ T; 0

. The only di¤erence to the standard war of attrition
with complete information is that, due to the time limit, no individual concedes
in ( c=2 + T; T ), but instead both choose a concession in T with strictly positive
probability.
In the symmetric equilibrium, no individual concedes immediately with positive
probability (that is, q0 = 0). There are asymmetric mixed strategy equilibria where
one of the individuals places a mass point at t = 0, i.e. concedes immediately with
strictly positive probability. Obviously, there cant be an equilibrium where both
individuals have a mass point at zero, because then waiting an innitesimally small
amount of time would, at a negligibly higher expected waiting cost, strictly increase
the probability that the rival provides the public good.
The xed time limit has an important impact on the individuals equilibrium
behavior if T > c=2. At the beginning of the game, the individuals are willing to
concede, and they play a mixed strategy for a certain time period (t 2 (0; c=2 + T )).
10For a detailed analysis see Hendricks et al. (1988).
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As the time limit approaches, it becomes less costly to wait until the end, and
thus there is a point in time after which the individuals are inactive (for all t 2
( c=2 + T; T )) because they prefer the random selection at T . Finally, they put the
remaining probability mass on a concession at T .
From Lemma 2, we can compute the individualsexpected payo¤in the symmetric
equilibrium, which is equal to
E (i) =
(
v   c=2  T if T  c=2
v   c if T > c=2 , i = 1; 2: (3)
One individual knows his cost of provision. Suppose that only individual j
has become informed about his provision cost, while i 6= j remained uninformed. js
strategy is now contingent on his type (denoted by jL or jH), and is optimal strategy
is to choose his concession time as if his cost was c. Recall that we still assume that
Assumption 1 holds.
Lemma 3 (One individual is informed.)
a) If T  c=2, in equilibrium, qi (T ) = qjH (T ) = 1, and qjL (0) = 1. (If T = c=2,
there is an additional equilibrium where qi (0) = 1 and qjL (T ) = 1.)
b) If c=2 < T < c=2  c ln pH ,
(i) there is a pure strategy equilibrium where qi (0) = 1;
(ii) there is a mixed strategy equilibrium where Fi (t) = 
 
t; cL;  c2 + T; 0

,
FjL (t) =
1
pL


t; c;  c
2
+ T; 1  (1  pL) e  12+Tc

, and qjH (T ) = 1.
c) If T  c=2  c ln pH , in equilibrium, qi (0) = 1.
If T < c=2, both i and jH prefer a random selection at T to any concession before
T , and this makes it optimal for jL to concede immediately. Since there is positive
probability that the time limit T is reached, the equilibrium strategies of i and jH
are uniquely pinned down.
If T > c=2, the structure of the equilibrium reverses, and there is a pure strategy
equilibriumwhere i concedes immediately and both jL and jH wait until T . To
11
be precise, there is a continuum of payo¤-equivalent equilibria where i concedes
immediately and j chooses a (su¢ ciently) high waiting time for each of the two
possible provision costs he could have been informed of (su¢ ciently high to make it
optimal for i to concede immediately). Given that Assumption 1 holds, by Lemma
1, jH will never provide the public good with strictly positive probability before
T . Thus, there is no further pure strategy equilibrium. To see why, suppose that
i concedes in t0 > 0 with probability one. jLs best response is either tjL = 0, or
tjL > t
0
, and i strictly prefers a concession in t0=2 over a concession in t0 since in
both cases this doesnt change his probability of contribution, but strictly reduces
the expected waiting cost.
There can, however, be an additional equilibrium which is in mixed strategies. In
fact, if c=2 < T < c=2  c ln pH , there is a mixed strategy equilibriumwhere i and
jL randomize their concession time. By Assumption 1 and Lemma 1, jH will never
provide the public good before T . Thus, in any equilibrium in mixed strategies, only
i and jL contribute before T with strictly positive probability, and the equilibrium
strategies exhibit similar properties as in the case of complete information.
Contrary to the case where no individual knows his cost, the mixed strategy
equilibrium is uniquely determined by the condition that there is zero probability
that any individual concedes in ( c=2 + T; T ) and that therefore jL concedes before
 c=2 + T with probability one (see Appendix). This requires that FjL has a mass
point at zero, and thus is payo¤ in the mixed strategy equilibrium is strictly higher
than v   c, which is is payo¤ from conceding immediately.
The mixed strategy equilibrium characterized in Lemma 3b(ii) has several inter-
esting properties. Whenever pH and/or T are large, this equilibrium does not exist:
as it is likely that j has a high cost and the waiting time until T is costly, waiting
becomes too costly for individual i; thus i prefers to volunteer immediately. When
T ! c=2   c ln pH (from below), the probability that individual jL concedes imme-
diately converges to zero, and is expected payo¤ converges to v   c, which is equal
to his payo¤ in the pure strategy equilibrium. On the other hand, when T ! c=2
(from above), the probability that jL concedes immediately converges to one, and the
probability that i concedes before T converges to zero. The equilibrium strategies in
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the mixed strategy equilibrium and the individualsexpected payo¤s converge to the
equilibrium for T < c=2. Since individuals are not symmetric in this continuation
game and there is no particular reason to focus on one or the other equilibrium,11
the analysis of the individualsincentives to become informed will distinguish which
equilibrium is selected in case exactly one individual learned his cost of provision
and T > c=2.
Given that the pure strategy equilibrium is selected (Lemma 3b(i)), ex ante ex-
pected payo¤s are
E (i) =
(
v   pH
 
c
2
+ T

if T < c
2
v   c if T > c
2
(4)
E (j) =
(
v   pLcL   pH
 
cH
2
+ T

if T < c
2
v if T > c
2
(5)
In case the mixed strategy equilibrium is selected (Lemma 3b(ii)), ex ante expected
payo¤s equal
E (i) =
8><>:
v   pH
 
c
2
+ T

if T < c
2
v   pHe  12+Tc c if c2 < T < c2   c ln pH
v   c if T  c
2
  c ln pH
(6)
E (j) =
8><>:
v   pLcL   pH
 
cH
2
+ T

if T < c
2
v   cL   pH2 e
c 2T
2cL (cH + c  2cL) if c2 < T < c2   c ln pH
v if T  c
2
  c ln pH
(7)
For T < c=2, jL concedes immediately; therefore, the expected payo¤ of the unin-
formed individual i increases with the probability that j has a low contribution cost.
Note that in this case E (i) > E (j), i.e. the individual who does not know his cost
of provision has a higher expected payo¤ than the informed individual. For a large
T , however, the uninformed individual may concede immediately and gets a lower
expected payo¤.
11In particular, the two equilibria cannot be Pareto-ranked.
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Both individuals know their cost of provision. Suppose that both individuals
have decided to acquire information about their provision cost. By Lemma 1 together
with Assumption 1, there cant be an equilibrium where a type of i with high cost,
iH , provides the public good in tiH < T with strictly positive probability. If iH
chooses a time of concession tiH < T with strictly positive probability, then jH must
concede before tiH with probability one, contradicting Lemma 1. Therefore, in any
equilibrium, qiH (T ) = qjH (T ) = 1.
It remains to characterize the individualsequilibrium strategies for a low pro-
vision cost. As before, denote by iL an individual i with low cost. There cant be
an equilibrium where iL chooses a pure strategy. In particular, there cant be an
equilibrium where an individual with low cost volunteers immediately. To see why,
suppose that iL chooses t = 0 with probability one. jLs best response is to concede
in t0 = ", " innitesimally small, knowing that iH will wait until T . But then, iL is
strictly better o¤ by choosing t00 = 2".
Hence, individuals randomize their waiting time if they have a low provision
cost. By Lemma 1, there must be zero probability that an individual volunteers in
the interval ( cL=2 + T; T ), and at most one individual can have a mass point at
zero. As it is a typical feature of the war of attrition, there may be a continuum of
equilibria which di¤er in the size of the mass point at zero. Since the individuals are
symmetric ex ante, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium.
Lemma 4 (Both individuals are informed.)
In the symmetric equilibrium, qiH (T ) = 1 and FiL (t) =
1
pL
 (t; cL; t; 0) where t =
min
  cL
2
+ T; cL ln pH
	
, i = 1; 2.
If the probability pH that the other individual has a high cost is large, it is more
attractive for an individual with low cost to volunteer early. For su¢ ciently high pH ,
iL and jL concede before T with probability one. This holds if   cL2 + T   cL ln pH
or
T  cL
2
  cL ln pH :
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Otherwise, the low types put strictly positive probability on a concession in T , as
waiting until T is less costly. Again, up to a point in time t, there is a positive
probability that an individual concedes in case he has a low cost, and there is a time
period just before T where both individuals are inactive, since they prefer to wait
until T if the cost of the additional waiting time is su¢ ciently low. Ex ante expected
payo¤s are
E (i) =
(
v   cL   pH2 (cH   cL) e
1
2
  T
cL if T < cL
2
  cL ln pH
v   cL   p2H
 
T + cH
2
  cL (1  ln pH)

if T  cL
2
  cL ln pH
(8)
for i = 1; 2:
4 The value of becoming informed
This section considers the decisions on information acquisition in a 22 game dened
by the payo¤s in the war of attrition that have been determined in the previous
section.12 Let i 2 fN; Ig be an individual is decision on information where I refers
to information acquisition and N to a decision not to learn ones own provision cost.
Moreover, denote by E


(i;j)
i

individual is ex ante expected payo¤ in the war
of attrition given the decisions (i; j). In case (I; I), for instance, both individuals
have learned their cost of provision, whereas case (N; I) refers to a situation where
exactly one individual has decided to learn his cost. Given j, is value of information
can be dened as
V
j
i = E


(I;j)
i

  E


(N;j)
i

:
12This approach is employed to simplify the exposition, and it shows that in the equilibrium of
the 2  2 game, one player may remain uninformed. The equilibria of the reduced game can also
be supported as Perfect Bayesian equilibria in the analysis of the two-stage game, assuming beliefs
about the rivals type that do not change with the information acquisition decision (players have
no private information when deciding whether to acquire information).
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For the analysis of the optimal decision on information acquisition, we have to dis-
tinguish whether or not T > c=2. This distinction does not inuence the equilibrium
of the war of attrition in case both individuals know their provision cost, but it is
crucial for the nature of the equilibrium if at least one individual does not know his
cost of provision.13
Lemma 5 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds.
(i) V j=Ni is strictly positive for all T .
(ii) V j=Ii is strictly negative if T is su¢ ciently small and strictly increasing in T
for T 2 (cL=2; c=2).
(iii) Suppose in case (N; I) the pure strategy equilibrium is selected. Then V j=Ii is
strictly positive for all T > c=2.
(iv) Suppose in case (N; I) the mixed strategy equilibrium is selected. Then V j=Ii is
continuous and strictly increasing in T for T 2 (cL=2; c=2  c ln pH).
Provided that the rival does not learn his cost of provision (j = N), learning
ones own cost always increases ones expected payo¤ as the value of information
is positive (Lemma 5 part (i)). If instead the rival decides to learn his cost and
T is small, this result is reversed. However, as long as T < c=2, an increasing
time limit makes waiting more costly in case the rival has a high provision cost,
which increases ones own value of information (part (ii)). If T > c=2, the value of
information depends on which equilibrium is selected in case (N; I). For the pure
strategy equilibrium, is value of information given that j learns his cost of provision,
V Ii , exhibits a discontinuity at T = c=2 and is strictly positive for all T > c=2 (part
(iii)). For the mixed strategy equilibrium, however, V Ii is continuous at T = c=2.
This continuity in T makes the analysis for the selected equilibrium more appealing.
Yet the following proposition holds independently of which equilibrium is selected in
case only one individual decides to learn his provision cost.14
13We still assume that Assumption 1 holds. If T < cL=2, then decisions on information are
irrelevant, since both individuals never concede before T . If T > cH=2, the war of attrition always
has equilibria where one of the individuals concedes immediately, independent of the decisions on
information.
14Due to the possible multiplicity of equilibria of the war of attrition in case of T > c=2, depart-
ing from the analysis of the reduced form game makes the equilibrium analysis more complex in
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Proposition 1 Consider the game of information acquisition and suppose that As-
sumption 1 holds. There exists a threshold ~T > cL=2 such that
(i) if T < ~T , there are two asymmetric equilibria where exactly one individual ac-
quires information and one symmetric equilibrium where both individuals randomize
their information decision;
(ii) if T > ~T , it is strictly dominant to acquire information.
If both individuals remained uninformed, this would cause a high ine¢ ciency
in the volunteering game and lead to the lowest expected payo¤s. Therefore, it
is benecial for at least one individual to nd out about his provision cost even
if information acquisition leads to a higher ex ante probability of being the one
who concedes rst. As a consequence, there is never an equilibrium where both
individuals decide not to learn their cost of provision. If, however, T is su¢ ciently
small and only individual j acquires information, then j concedes immediately with
high probability, and i prefers to remain uninformed. Being uninformed constitutes
a strategic advantage in the volunteering game, being a commitment not to volunteer
too early. This, in turn, induces the rival to concede immediately, which outweighs
is waiting cost in case j has a high provision cost. For a higher T , this waiting
cost increases, and, in the case of the mixed strategy equilibrium in (N; I), the
probability that j concedes immediately decreases. There exists a threshold ~T such
that, for T > ~T , i is better o¤ if he nds out about his provision cost as well. If
the value of information V Ii is negative for all (cL=2; c=2), the location of ~T depends
on which equilibrium is selected in case (N; I). In both cases, the threshold ~T is
uniquely determined such that V Ii is negative for all T < ~T and positive for all
T > ~T .
Corollary 1 (i) If in case (N; I) the pure strategy equilibrium is selected, ~T  c=2.
(ii) If in case (N; I) the mixed strategy equilibrium is selected and pH is small, ~T is
strictly larger than c=2. Then, there may be no equilibrium where both individuals
acquire information with probability one for all T fullling Assumption 1.
this case. Then, players can condition their strategies in the war of attrition on the information
acquisition. As in our analysis for the pure strategy equilibrium in case (N; I), this can support
information acquisition of both players in equilibrium if T > c=2.
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If T > c=2 and, in case (N; I), the pure strategy equilibrium is selected, learning
the own provision cost is strictly dominant, and thus the threshold ~T is (weakly)
smaller than c=2.15 However, if we focus on the mixed strategy equilibrium, ~T > c=2
for a small pH , and the value of information V Ii can even be negative for all T 2
(cL=2; cH=2). Thus, the strategic value of remaining uninformed is not only present
in the case where an uninformed individual i has a dominant strategy not to concede
before T (as in Lemma 3a), but also when the individuals randomize their concession
time (as in Lemma 3b(ii)). The su¢ ciently high probability that the rival has a low
cost and volunteers immediately with positive probability makes it optimal for i to
disregard information that is available without cost. This strategic value disappears
only if the probability of having a high contribution cost, pH , is large, because, from
the point of view of the rival, an early concession of the individual who knows his
provision cost is less likely.
Example Consider the following example where cL = 2, and cH = 10. As-
sumption 1 requires that 1 < T < 5.
(a) Suppose that pH = 0:75. If T ! c=2 = 4 from below, the value of information
V Ii is positive. Hence, the critical threshold ~T < c=2. Setting V
I
i (T ) = 0 yields
~T = 1:94. Thus, for all T < 1:94, only one individual learns his cost of provision,
and for all T > 1:94, both individuals learn their cost of provision.
(b) Now suppose that pH = 0:5. V Ii is negative if T approaches c=2 = 3 (from below).
Hence, if in case (N; I) the pure strategy equilibrium is selected, ~T = c=2 = 3, and
if the mixed strategy equilibrium is selected, ~T > c=2. In the latter case, ~T = 3:56.
(c) If pH = 0:25, again V Ii is negative if T approaches c=2 = 2, and ~T = c=2
if in case (N; I) the pure strategy equilibrium is selected. If the mixed strategy
equilibrium is selected, V Ii is negative for all T satisfying Assumption 1, and thus
there is no equilibrium where both individuals nd out about their cost of provision
with probability one.
15Concretely, if V j=Ii is negative for all T < c=2, ~T = c=2. Otherwise, ~T is dened as the
solution to V j=Ii

~T

= 0.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium information acquisition (for cL = 2; cH = 10).
Figure 1 shows the equilibrium outcome for di¤erent combinations of T and pH .
The 45-degree line describes the condition T = c=2. In the areas B and D, nding
out about the own cost of provision is strictly dominant; in area A, the individuals
prefer to remain uninformed if the rival acquires information, and in equilibrium only
one individual learns his cost (or both individuals randomize their information ac-
quisition decision). In area C, the outcome depends on which equilibrium is selected
in case (N; I). Here, T > c=2, and for the pure strategy equilibrium, information
acquisition is strictly dominant. For the mixed strategy equilibrium, however, only
one individual acquires information.
A designers perspective. There are several dimensions along which e¢ ciency
can be dened. On the one hand, a designer could be interested in the individual
with the lowest cost (highest ability) providing the public good. On the other hand,
the designer might want to minimize the expected waiting time.16 To capture these
di¤erent dimensions, consider the following objective function
W = 2v   1E (min ft1; t2g)  2E (k (t1; t2))
16In a framework of a contest, a designer may want to induce long times of ghting, i.e. high
waiting times.
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where
k (t1; t2) =
8><>:
c1 if t1 < t2
(c1 + c2) =2 if t1 = t2
c2 if t1 > t2
is the (expected) cost of providing the public good and 1 and 2 are the weights
given to the expected waiting time and the expected provision cost. We assume that
the designer does not know the individualscost of provision and cannot change the
structure of the game.
Suppose rst that 1 = 0 and 2 > 0, that is, maximizing W is equivalent
to minimizing the expected cost of provision, E (k (t1; t2)). Here, W is highest if
both individuals acquire information (case (I; I)) and an individual with low cost
volunteers with probability one before the time limit is reached. This implies that
T > cL=2   cL ln pH (by Lemma 4) and T > ~T (by Proposition 1). In this case,
information acquisition is e¢ cient.
Remark 1 If the designer wants to minimize the expected cost of provision, a suf-
ciently high time limit ensures both e¢ cient information acquisition and e¢ cient
provision of the public good.
Another objective could be to focus on the expected waiting time. Let 2 = 0.
Obviously, if 1 > 0, the time horizon should be as short as possible, and W is
maximized for T = 0. In this case, the decisions on information become irrelevant.17
If the designer takes into account both the expected cost of provision and the
expected waiting cost, a benevolent designer may want to maximize the individuals
expected payo¤s, which is equivalent to 1 = 2 and 2 = 1. Then, T = 0 need not be
17If T > c=2 and in case (N; I) the pure strategy is selected, W would also be maximized if
exactly one individual acquires information. This, however, does not occur in equilibrium if the
individuals decide on information acquisition, but only if information acquisition is forbidden for
one individual. In this sense, there can be too much information acquisition in equilibrium if 1 > 0
and 2 = 0. If instead 1 < 0 and the designer wants to maximize the expected waiting time, the
waiting times are highest if T > c=2 and none of the individuals acquires information. Thus, it
would be optimal to prohibit information acquisition.
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optimal: if T is only slightly larger than cL=2, one individual acquires information,
and he concedes immediately in case he has a low cost. The gain from the decrease
in the expected provision cost (due to information acquisition) outweighs the higher
waiting cost if pH is su¢ ciently small and/or cH is large, and it can be optimal to
choose an intermediate time limit such that individuals have an incentive to acquire
information and to choose an early concession if they have a low provision cost.
Similarly, it can be desirable that both individuals acquire information. In the latter
case (case (I; I)), the sum of expected payo¤s is highest if T = cL=2  cL ln pH such
that individuals with low cost concede before T with probability one. Higher T do
not change the e¢ ciency of the provision (captured by k (t1; t2)), but increase the
waiting cost given that both individuals have a high cost. In general, the optimal
choice of T depends on the balancing of expected waiting time and cost of provision
and on the probability of facing individuals with a high cost of provision.
Remark 2 If the designer wants to maximize the sum of expected payo¤s, the trade-
o¤ between e¢ ciency of the provision and cost of waiting makes an intermediate time
limit optimal whenever pH is su¢ ciently small and/or cH is large.
5 Extensions
Sequential decisions on information. Whenever there is an incentive to remain
uninformed, this can cause a coordination problem. When individuals randomize
their information acquisition decision, they may acquire too much or too little infor-
mation from their own point of view. Considering sequential choices on information
can mitigate this coordination problem, and it will reect, for instance, situations
where individuals can, one after the other, ask questions about a task that has to be
performed.
Suppose that decisions on information take place sequentially: individual 1 de-
cides rst, and individual 2 moves second.18 As stated in Proposition 1, information
18We do not discuss the question of endogenous timing of information acquisition decisions.
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acquisition is strictly dominant for T > ~T , and both individuals will acquire infor-
mation. For T < ~T , however, if individual 1 acquires information, 2 will remain
uninformed, and vice-versa.
Proposition 2 Suppose that decisions on information take place sequentially and
Assumption 1 holds. If the time horizon is su¢ ciently small, the rst mover will
decide to remain uninformed, and the second mover will acquire information.
Whenever T < c=2 and exactly one individual has acquired information, the
payo¤ of the uninformed individual is higher than the payo¤ of the informed indi-
vidual. Thus, individuals prefer to be the uninformed player. If T > c=2, we have to
distinguish which equilibrium is selected in case (N; I). For the mixed strategy equi-
librium, a strategic incentive to remain uninformed exists, and an increasing time
horizon T makes it less attractive to remain uninformed. There is, however, a range
of parameters T where the strategic advantage from being uninformed is su¢ ciently
high such that a rst mover would choose to remain uninformed.
Information about a common value. In the previous section, we have identied
a strategic value of ignorance in situations where information about a private value
can be obtained. If the information is about some component which is common to all
individuals, a similar strategic incentive is present. Consider the extreme case of a
pure common value and suppose that the individualscosts of provision are perfectly
correlated. Thus, if an individual has acquired information, he knows not only his
own type, but also his rivals type.
In the war of attrition, if no individual has acquired information, the analysis does
not change. Moreover, if both individuals have acquired information, they randomize
their concession time if they both have a low cost, and they wait until T if they both
have a high cost.
If exactly one individual knows the cost of provision and T < c=2, the equilibrium
of the war of attrition is similar to the one characterized in Lemma 3a. Here, if the
informed individual j does not concede immediately, the uninformed individual i
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knows that his cost is high and will nd it optimal to wait until T .19
If T > c=2, the mixed strategy equilibrium of Lemma 3b(ii) does not exist. The
intuition is as follows. If there were such an equilibrium, the uninformed individual
i would update his beliefs about his cost following the action of this rival, and
if the game reaches a point in time   c
2
+ T   ,  positive but small, i would
know almost with certainty that his cost is high. But then, i would not concede in   c
2
+ T   ;  c
2
+ T

, but instead wait until T .
For T  c=2, there is an equilibrium where the uninformed individual concedes
immediately (qi (0) = 1). Moreover, contrary to the case of private values, there is
an equilibrium where qjL (0) = 1 and qjH (T ) = qi (T ) = 1. Here, i knows that his
cost is high if there is no immediate concession of j and thus nds it optimal to wait
until T . In turn, j cannot protably deviate given that qi (T ) = 1.
As in the private values case, we consider the 22 game of information acquisition
dened by the payo¤s in the war of attrition.
Proposition 3 Consider the game of information acquisition with common values
and suppose that Assumption 1 holds.
(i) If T < c=2, only one individual acquires information in equilibrium;
(ii) if T  c=2, dependent on the equilibrium selection in the war of attrition (case
(N; I)), only one individual or both individuals acquire information in equilibrium.
In case of T  c=2, the war of attrition in case (N; I) has two diametrically
opposed equilibria, and decisions on information crucially depend on which of the
equilibria is played. For a small T , however, as in the case of private values, one
individual strategically chooses to remain uninformed of the cost of provision, and
in turn the informed individual concedes immediately if the (common) cost is low.20
19There is no further pure strategy equilibrium because, even if qjL (T ) = qjH (T ) = 1, is
best response is qi (T ) = 1. Moreover, there is no mixed strategy equilibrium: intuitively, if jL
randomized and i provided the good at some t > 0, i would know that his expected cost would be
higher than c (it becomes more likely that the cost is high); thus, i prefers to wait until T .
20As in Proposition 1, there are two asymmetric equilibria where exactly one individual acquires
information and one symmetric equilibrium where both individuals randomize their information
acquisition decision.
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Lost opportunity of provision at T . The provision of many public goods is
allocated on a voluntary basis, but it is compulsory in the sense that one individual
has to contribute. In companies, for instance, a team leader may select one individual
if no one volunteers. Other public goods can only be provided within a certain period,
after which the opportunity of provision disappears.
Instead of assuming that at T one individual is randomly selected, suppose that
the investment opportunity disappears if no individual has conceded before T . In this
case, the incentive to wait until T in the war of attrition is weakened; the analysis,
however, qualitatively carries over from the previous section if we modify Assumption
1 on the time limit such that individuals with a high cost do not want to provide
the public good and individuals with a low cost prefer to concede. This requires the
time limit to be such that:
Assumption 1 0 <   (v   cL) < T <   (v   cH) :
Hence, high types have a (weakly) dominant strategy to wait until T . Moreover,
if T is su¢ ciently small (T <   (v   c)) and only individual j knows his contribution
cost, the uninformed individual i waits until T (as in Lemma 3a). For a larger T ,
there is an equilibrium where i and jL randomize on some interval [0; t][fTg (similar
to Lemma 3b(ii)) and jL has a mass point at zero.
Proposition 4 Consider the game of information acquisition and suppose that at T
the opportunity of provision disappears. If Assumption 1holds and T is su¢ ciently
small, only one individual acquires information in equilibrium.
We do not provide a complete analysis of equilibria of the war of attrition21 and
incentives to acquire information, but we show that, whenever T is small, there is a
strategic value of ignorance: as in the previous section, remaining uninformed can be
used as a commitment not to concede if an individuals expected cost of provision is
su¢ ciently high in relation to the payo¤ from waiting until T .
21A detailed analysis of equilibria of the war of attrition would build on Theorems 1-3 in Hendricks
et al. (1988).
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6 Conclusion
The private provision of a discrete public good is likely to end up in a war of attrition:
individuals prefer to wait until someone else volunteers and provides the public good.
But they may not be able to wait for an innite amount of time. This can be due
to time constraints or to a nite time horizon imposed by a third party. In many
applications, such as allocating tasks in rms or communities, time limits are a
typical feature of the volunteering game.
In this paper, we analyzed incentives to obtain information ahead of a war of at-
trition. The information that is available to the individuals has an important impact
on the equilibrium outcome of the volunteering game. This suggests that individuals
have an incentive to use information acquisition strategically when they anticipate
the private provision game. We assumed that initially the individuals do not know
exactly their own cost of provision of the public good, but that they can nd out
about this cost prior to the volunteering game. Indeed, there can be an incentive for
one individual not to become informed of his cost of provision even if the information
is available without cost. For a su¢ ciently short time horizon, being uninformed in-
duces an informed individual to volunteer immediately in case he has a low cost of
provision, whereas not knowing the own cost of provision constitutes a commitment
to delay the own concession. For a su¢ ciently long time horizon, however, nding
out about the own cost is a strictly dominant strategy. Since the time horizon has
a crucial impact on information acquisition as well as on the equilibrium outcome of
the volunteering game, it may be used as an instrument to inuence the e¢ ciency of
the public good provision.
Our model assumed that the individualscosts of provision follow a two-point
probability distribution. For continuous distribution functions, similar results can
be obtained. The equilibrium properties change in the sense that an individual with
private information about his cost of provision chooses his concession time as an
increasing function of his provision cost. In the case where exactly one individual
has learned his cost, we get a similar result for a small time limit T : the informed
individual volunteers immediately if he has a low cost of provision, which creates
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an incentive for the rival to remain uninformed of his own cost. For intermediate
values of T , a mixed strategy equilibrium exists that exhibits similar properties to
the one characterized in Lemma 3b(ii). The value of information is then determined
by the shape of the probability distribution of the provision cost. The resulting
e¤ects are qualitatively the same, but can be most clearly demonstrated by using a
two-point distribution and varying the probabilities that the cost of provision is high
and low, respectively. The key assumption remains that with positive probability
individuals face a rival who prefers to wait until the time limit is reached. In this
sense, our approach is similar to Fudenberg and Tirole (1986), who assume that there
is a positive probability that the rival never concedes. For the incentives to nd out
about the cost of provision, the time limit is of additional strategic importance.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Denote by 	j the distribution of js waiting times, from the point of view of i, that
is, 	j (t) = a means that, from the point of view of i, j concedes before t with
probability a.22 Consider a concession of i in ti 2 ( ci=2 + T; T ) and suppose that
there is a strictly positive probability that i provides the good in ti, i.e. 	j (ti) < 1.
If 	j exhibits a discontinuity at ti, then there is an " > 0 such that i is strictly better
o¤ by conceding in ti + " instead of in ti, because this would strictly decrease the
expected contribution cost at only an innitesimally higher expected waiting cost.
22Note that 	j captures both uncertainty of i over js contribution cost and possible randomiza-
tion of j.
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Otherwise, is expected payo¤ from a concession in ti isZ ti
0
(v   t) d	j (t) + (1 	j (ti)) (v   ti   ci)
=
Z T
0
(v   t) d	j (t) 
Z T
ti
(v   t) d	j (t)
+ (1 	j (T )) (v   ti   ci) + (	j (T ) 	j (ti)) (v   ti   ci)
=
Z T
0
(v   t) d	j (t) + (1 	j (T )) (v   ti   ci)
 
Z T
ti
(ti + ci   t) d	j (t) : (9)
	j (ti) < 1 implies that 	j (T )   	j (ti) > 0 or/and 1   	j (T ) > 0. Therefore, for
all ti 2 ( ci=2 + T; T ), (9) is strictly smaller thanZ T
0
(v   t) d	j (t) + (1 	j (T )) (v   ci=2  T )
which is is expected payo¤ for ti = T .
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
(i) As argued in the main text, the best response to tj = T is ti = T , and qi (T ) =
qj (T ) = 1 is an equilibrium. Moreover, since  ci=2 + T < 0, Lemma 1 rules out
any further equilibrium because any individual who contributes with strictly positive
probability in t0 2 [0; T ) would strictly prefer a concession in T to a concession in t0.
(ii) The structure of the equilibrium strategies follows from Hendricks et al. (1988)
and the analysis in the main text. We only show that the strategies constitute an
equilibrium. Suppose that j randomizes according to Fj (t) = 
 
t; c;  c
2
+ T; 0

,
where  is dened in (2). Then, by Lemma 1, i strictly prefers ti = T to any
ti 2 ( c=2 + T; T ). For ti 2 [0; c=2 + T ], is payo¤ isZ ti
0
(v   x) 1
c
exp

 x
c

dx+ exp

 ti
c

(v   ti   c) = v   c;
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and if ti = T , i getsZ   c
2
+T
0
(v   x) 1
c
exp

 x
c

dx+ exp

1
2
  T
c

v   T   c
2

= v   c:
Thus i is indi¤erent between all ti 2 (0; c=2 + T ][fTg, and Fi and Fj are mutually
best responses.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Parts a), b(i) and c) follow directly from the analysis in the main text. It remains
to prove part b(ii). If there is an equilibrium in mixed strategies, the equilibrium
strategies must exhibit similar properties as in the case of complete information. In
particular, for waiting times ti and tjL in the support of the mixed strategies, it has
to hold that
Fi (ti) = 1  (1  bi) exp

  ti
cL

; (10)
FjL (tjL) =
1
pL

1  (1  pLbjL) exp

 tjL
c

; (11)
where the constants bi and bjL correspond to the mass points at zero, Fi (0) and
FjL (0), and remain to be determined. The factor 1=pL in FjL takes into account the
probability pL that i faces a rival with cost cL. It has to hold that 0  bi; bjL < 1, and
min (bi; bjL) = 0 : if i (jL) concedes immediately with strictly positive probability, jL
(i) strictly prefers a concession in " > 0, " innitesimally small, to a concession in 0.
Assumption 1 implies that no tjH < T with Fi (tjH ) < 1 can be part of jHs
equilibrium strategy: jH wont choose any tjH < T in the support of Fi. In turn,
for any ti < T , we must have FjH (ti) = 0, and thus i strictly prefers ti = T to all
ti 2 ( c=2 + T; T ). Moreover, Fi must be continuous on (0; T ). To see why, suppose
that i concedes in ti 2 (0; c=2 + T ] with strictly positive probability. Then, there
are  > 0; " > 0 such that jL strictly prefers tj = ti + " to any tj 2 (ti   ; ti), hence
i is strictly better o¤ by choosing ti   =2 instead of ti. Therefore, possible mass
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points of Fi are restricted to ti = 0 and ti = T .
We proceed in two steps: rst we show that the mass points at zero are uniquely
determined, and second we prove that (10) and (11) constitute an equilibrium.
Step 1 : From (10), it follows that bi < 1 implies Fi (ti) < 1 for all ti < T :
whenever i chooses a mixed strategy, there is strictly positive probability that ti = T .
In particular, we have Fi ( c=2 + T ) < 1, which implies that FjL ( c=2 + T ) = 1.
This is due to the fact that there is a strictly positive probability that i waits until
T , and, as in the case of Fi above, FjL must be continuous on (0; T ). However, as
Fi is constant in ( c=2 + T; T ) and cL < c, jL strictly prefers tjL =  c=2 + T to all
tjL >  c=2 + T , and therefore FjL ( c=2 + T ) < 1 contradicts the nonexistence of
interior mass points.
With (11), min (bi; bjL) = 0; and FjL ( c=2 + T ) = 1, we get
bi = 0 and bjL =
1
pL

1  (1  pL) exp

 1
2
+
T
c

: (12)
bjL is strictly decreasing in T with limT#c=2 bjL = 1 and limT"c=2 c ln pH bjL = 0. Hence,
c=2 < T < c=2  c ln pH is a necessary condition for the existence of a mixed strategy
equilibrium.23
Step 2 : It remains to show that (10), (11) and (12) indeed constitute an equilib-
rium. Consider rst individual i and suppose that j follows FjL and FjH , respectively.
For any ti 2 (0; c=2 + T ], is expected payo¤ is
v   pL
Z ti
0
x
1  pL
pL
1
c
e 
1
2
+T x
c dx  (1  pL) e  12+
T ti
c (c+ ti)
which is equal to v   (1  pL) exp ( 1=2 + T=c) c. If i concedes in T , he gets
v   pL
Z  c=2+T
0
x
1  pL
pL
1
c
e 
1
2
+T x
c dx  (1  pL)
 c
2
+ T

23To be precise, if T = c=2   c ln pH , we get bjL = 0 and bi  0 is not uniquely determined.
Hence, there exists a continuum of mixed strategy equilibria where is payo¤ is v  c, as in the pure
strategy equilibrium. We omit this case in order to simplify the exposition.
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which again is equal to v  (1  pL) exp ( 1=2 + T=c) c. Hence, i is indi¤erent to all
t 2 (0; c=2 + T ] [ fTg. Any ti 2 ( c=2 + T; T ) leads to a lower payo¤.
Now turn to j and suppose that i follows Fi. The equilibrium strategy of jH
follows from Lemma 1. For jL, a concession in t 2 [0; c=2 + T ] yields an expected
payo¤ ofZ t
0
(v   x) 1
cL
e
  x
cL dx+ e
  t
cL (v   cL   t) = v   cL:
Hence, jL is indeed indi¤erent to all t 2 [0; c=2 + T ]. For all t >  c=2 + T , jLs
expected payo¤ is strictly lower. The ex ante expected payo¤s in the second row of
(6) and (7) follow directly from these calculations.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
By Assumption 1 and Lemma 1, FiH (t) = 0 for all t < T and FiH (t) = 1 otherwise,
i = 1; 2: Thus, for iL, a concession in T is strictly preferred to any t 2 ( cL=2 + T; T ).
Suppose that jL follows FjL . For any ti 2 [0; t), iLs payo¤ is
pL
Z ti
0
(v   x) 1
pLcL
e
  x
cL dx+ e
  ti
cL (v   ti   cL) = v   cL:
By choosing ti = T , iL gets
pL
Z t
0
(v   x) 1
pLcL
e
  x
cL dx+ e
  t
cL

v   T   cL
2

= v   cL + exp

  t
cL

t  T + cL
2

:
If
 cL
2
+ T <  cL ln (1  pL) ; (13)
t =   cL
2
+ T , and iL is indi¤erent between all ti 2 [0; t) [ fTg: (13) implies that
FiL (t) < 1 and iL waits until T with strictly positive probability. If (13) is violated,
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t =  cL ln (1  pL) and FiL (t) = 1, that is, iL concedes with probability one before
t < T . Indeed, waiting until T would lead to a payo¤ lower than v   cL. Since
any symmetric equilibrium must be in mixed strategies, this is the only symmetric
equilibrium. Expected payo¤ of iL is v   cL, and expected payo¤ of iH is
pL
Z t
0
(v   x) 1
pLcL
e
  x
cL dx+ e
  t
cL

v   T   cH
2

= v   cL + exp

  t
cL

cL   cH
2
+ t  T

:
Hence, the ex ante expected payo¤ is
E (i) = v   cL + pH exp

  t
cL

cL   cH
2
+ t  T

:
Inserting t leads to (8).
A.5 Proof of Lemma 5
(i) Suppose that T < c=2. Together with (3) and (5),
V Ni =  pLcL   pH
cH
2
+ T

+
c
2
+ T =  pL cL
2
+ (1  pH)T > 0:
If T > c=2, expected payo¤ is v   c in case (N;N) which is the payo¤ an informed
individual i can ensure by conceding immediately for both possible contribution costs.
Since for a high contribution cost, i strictly prefers waiting until T , his payo¤ must
be strictly higher. Thus, V j=Ni > 0 for all T 2 (cL=2; cH=2).
(ii) If T < cL=2   cL ln pH , subtracting the rst row in (4) from the rst row in (8)
leads to
V Ii (T ) =  cL  
pH
2
(cH   cL) e
1
2
  T
cL + pH
 c
2
+ T

: (14)
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For T ! cL=2, (14) converges to
 cL   pH
2
(cH   cL) + pH
2
(c+ cL) =  pLcL   pH
2
(cH   c) < 0:
Moreover, deriving (14) with respect to T yields
@V Ii (T )
@T
=
1
2
pH
cL
(cH   cL) e
1
2
  T
cL + pH > 0:
If cL=2  cL ln pH < T < c=2, using again (4) and (8) we have
V Ii (T ) =  cL   p2H

T +
cH
2
  cL + cL ln pH

+ pH
 c
2
+ T

(15)
and
@V Ii (T )
@T
=  p2H + pH > 0:
(iii) With (4), i gets v  c if he does not become informed. By the same argument as
in (i) for T > c=2, is ex ante payo¤ in case (I; I) must be strictly larger than v   c,
and thus V Ii > 0 for all T 2 (c=2; cH=2).
(iv) In (ii), monotonicity has been shown for T < c=2. Now suppose that T >
c=2. Consider rst the case where T is smaller than cL=2   cL ln pH , i.e. T 2
(c=2; cL=2  cL ln pH). (For a su¢ ciently large pH , this interval is empty.) Then,
with (6) and (8),
V Ii (T ) =  cL  
pH
2
(cH   cL) e
1
2
  T
cL + pHce
  1
2
+T
c (16)
and
@V Ii (T )
@T
=
pH
2cL
(cH   cL) e
1
2
  T
cL + pHe
  1
2
+T
c > 0:
Now suppose T is larger than cL=2   cL ln pH , but smaller than c=2   c ln pH , i.e.
T 2 (cL=2  cL ln pH ;min fc=2  c ln pH ; cH=2g). (This interval may be empty for a
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small pH .) We get
V Ii (T ) =  cL   p2H

T +
cH
2
  cL + cL ln pH

+ pHce
  1
2
+T
c (17)
and hence
@V Ii (T )
@T
=  p2H + pHe 
1
2
+T
c >  p2H + pH > 0:
Continuity of V Ii follows directly from continuity of the expected payo¤s.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 1
From Lemma 5(i), it follows that the best response to j = N is to become informed.
Now suppose that in case (N; I) the pure strategy equilibrium is selected. With
Lemma 5(ii)-(iii), there exists a unique ~T  c=2 such that the best response to
j = I is to remain uninformed if and only if T < ~T . In this case, there are
two asymmetric equilibria where one individual acquires information and the other
individual remains uninformed. In addition, there is a symmetric equilibrium where
the individuals randomize their information choice and learn their provision cost with
probability V Ni =
 
V Ni   V Ii
 2 (0; 1). If T > ~T , there is a unique equilibrium where
both individuals nd out about their provision cost.
For the mixed strategy equilibrium in case (N; I), this result follows frommonotonic-
ity of V Ii (Lemma 5ii+iv). Note that ~T < c=2   c ln pH as, for T ! c=2   c ln pH ,
V Ii converges to the value of information in the pure strategy equilibrium and hence
is strictly positive.24 Therefore, whenever c=2   c ln pH < cH=2, there exists an in-
terior ~T 2 (cL; c=2  c ln pH) such that the best response to j = I is to remain
uninformed if and only if T < ~T , and information acquisition is strictly dominant if
T > ~T . If c=2   c ln pH > cH=2, the interval where in equilibrium both individuals
acquire information can be empty which is the case if limT!cH=2 V
I
i is negative.
24This follows from the convergence of is expected payo¤ in case (N; I) for T ! c=2  c ln pH .
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A.7 Proof of Corollary 1
Part (i) follows from Lemma 5(iii). For part (ii), the threshold ~T is larger than c=2
if and only if the value of information is negative as T approaches c=2. Moreover,
V Ii may even be negative for all T . Note that c=2   c ln pH > cL=2   cL ln pH , and
for small pH , we have cL=2  cL ln pH > cH=2. With monotonicity of (16), it follows
that, for all T 2 (cL=2; cH=2), V Ii is smaller than
lim
T!cH=2
V Ii (T ) =  cL  
pH
2
(cH   cL) e
1
2
  cH
2cL + pHce
  1
2
+
cH
2c
which is negative for small pH since the second and the third term approach zero if
pH ! 0. For intermediate values of pH , we have ~T 2 (c=2; cH=2).
A.8 Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that i remains uninformed and j acquires information. If T < c=2, is
expected payo¤ is strictly higher than js expected payo¤ (compare the rst row in
(6) to the rst row in (7)). Thus, if T < min
n
c=2; ~T
o
, in the equilibrium of the
game of sequential information acquisition, the rst mover remains uninformed.
If T > c=2 and in case (N; I) the mixed strategy equilibrium is selected, by
continuity of the expected payo¤s, E (i) > E (j) also holds for T = c=2 + ,  > 0
su¢ ciently small (compare the second rows in (6) and (7)). As T ! c=2   c ln pH ,
the payo¤ of the uninformed player i approaches v   c, while the informed player j
gets strictly more than v   c.25 The di¤erence in payo¤s E (j)   E (i) is strictly
increasing in T , and there is a critical value Ts where E (j) = E (i). Depending
on the parameters of the model, Ts can be smaller or larger than the threshold ~T
for information acquisition. If Ts > ~T , in all equilibria where one player chooses
to remain uninformed, this will be the rst mover. If Ts < ~T , there can also be
equilibria of the game with sequential information acquisition where the rst mover
chooses to acquire information and the second mover remains uninformed.26
25By choosing qjL (0) = 1 and qjH (T ) = 1, j can ensure a payo¤ of at least v   pLcL  
pH (cH=2 + T ), which is strictly larger than v   c; thus, his equilibrium payo¤ cannot be smaller.
26This is the case, for instance, if cL = 2, cH = 10, and pH = 0:3. There, in case (N; I),
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A.9 Proof of Proposition 3
First of all, we solve for the payo¤s in the war of attrition. In case (N;N), expected
payo¤s are as in (3). In the symmetric equilibrium in case (I; I), if it is common
knowledge that both have a low cost, both individuals randomize and get an expected
payo¤ of v  cL. If both have a high cost, they wait until T . This leads to an ex ante
expected payo¤ of
v   pLcL   pH

T +
cH
2

: (18)
In case (N; I), if T < c=2, in equilibrium of the war of attrition, we have qi (T ) =
qjH (T ) = 1 and qjL (0) = 1. The uninformed individual i gets an expected payo¤ of
v   pH

T +
cH
2

which is strictly larger than (18). Thus, the best response to information acquisition
of j is to remain uninformed. The informed individual gets
v   pLcL   pH

T +
cH
2

which is strictly larger than the payo¤ in case (N;N). Therefore, in the equilibrium
of the game of information acquisition, only one individual acquires information.
For T  c=2, the same is true if in case (N; I) the equilibrium with qjL (0) = 1
is selected; then, in the war of attrition, equilibrium payo¤s are as above. If in case
(N; I) the equilibrium with qi (0) = 1 is selected, the uninformed individual gets an
expected payo¤ of v   c; in the game of information acquisition, both individuals
acquire information.
E (j) > E (i) in some interval

~T   ; ~T

,  > 0.
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A.10 Proof of Proposition 4
First, consider the war of attrition xing the decisions on information. We only
analyze the case where T <   (v   c). Note that this implies that, in the war of
attrition, uninformed individuals prefer to wait until T . Thus, in case (N;N) where
no individual is informed, both get an expected payo¤of  T . Moreover, if individual
i is uninformed and individual j knows his cost of provision (case (N; I)), i and jH
prefer waiting until T to any concession before T . Since v cL >  T , jL will concede
immediately. Ex ante expected payo¤s in case (N; I) are
E (i) = pLv + (1  pL) ( T )
E (j) = pL (v   cL) + (1  pL) ( T )
(19)
Now consider the war of attrition if both individuals know their provision cost.
Due to Assumption 1on the time limit, there is no equilibrium where an individual
concedes immediately or waits until T for both types. In the symmetric equilibrium,
qiH (T ) = qjH (T ) = 1, and low types randomize according to FiL (t) =
1
pL
 (t; cL; t; 0)
where t = min fT   ( v + cL) ; cL ln pHg : Similar to Lemma 4, if T is small, low-
cost types put a mass point at T , and if T is large, they concede before T with
probability one.27 This leads to an ex ante expected payo¤ in case (I; I) equal to
E (i) =
(
v   cL; T <   (v   cL)  cL ln pH
(1  p2H) (v   cL)  p2H (cL ln pH + T ) ; T    (v   cL)  cL ln pH
(20)
In the game of information acquisition, suppose that j acquires information and
T <   (v   cL)   cL ln pH . If i acquires information, his expected payo¤ is v   cL
(compare (20)). If i remains uninformed, by (19), he gets an expected payo¤ of
27A proof that these strategies constitute an equilibrium is omitted.
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pLv + (1  pL) ( T ) which is strictly larger than
pLv + (1  pL) ((v   cL) + cL ln pH)
= v   cL + cL (1  pH + pH ln pH)
> v   cL
where the inequality follows from the fact that 1 pH+pH ln pH > 0 for all pH 2 (0; 1).
Thus, if T is su¢ ciently small, only one individual acquires information. For
T    (v   cL)   cL ln pH , by continuity of the expected payo¤ in (20), the same
result holds if T is su¢ ciently close to   (v   cL) cL ln pH . For larger T , equilibrium
information acquisition depends on the parameter values.28
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